Behavioral CEOs: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence

  title={Behavioral CEOs: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence},
  author={Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey A. Tate},
  journal={Journal of Economic Perspectives},
In this paper, we provide a theoretical and empirical framework that allows us to synthesize and assess the burgeoning literature on CEO overconfidence. We also provide novel empirical evidence that overconfidence matters for corporate investment decisions in a framework that explicitly addresses the endogeneity of firms' financing constraints. 

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