Behavior-dependent contexts for repeated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma: II. Dynamical aspects of the evolution of cooperation.

@article{Feldman1987BehaviordependentCF,
  title={Behavior-dependent contexts for repeated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma: II. Dynamical aspects of the evolution of cooperation.},
  author={Marcus W. Feldman and Emily A Thomas},
  journal={Journal of theoretical biology},
  year={1987},
  volume={128 3},
  pages={297-315}
}
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma models are proposed in which, at any trial, the probability of staying in the game depends on the outcome of the previous trial. If a player's choice depends on its own play (cooperate or defect) at the previous trial, it becomes possible for cooperative strategies to increase when rare in a population of egoists. A dynamic analysis is used to demonstrate that stable polymorphisms may result, and may involve more strategies than just Tit-for-Tat and all-Defect. The… CONTINUE READING
Highly Cited
This paper has 45 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS