Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence: A Reply to Andrew Wayne

@article{Myrvold1996BayesianismAD,
  title={Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence: A Reply to Andrew Wayne},
  author={Wayne C. Myrvold},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  year={1996},
  volume={63},
  pages={661 - 665}
}
  • Wayne C. Myrvold
  • Published 1996
  • Sociology
  • Philosophy of Science
  • Andrew Wayne (1995) discusses some recent attempts to account, within a Bayesian framework, for the "common methodological adage" that "diverse evidence better confirms a hypothesis than does the same amount of similar evidence" (112). One of the approaches considered by Wayne is that suggested by Howson and Urbach (1989/1993) and dubbed the "correlation approach" by Wayne. This approach is, indeed, incomplete, in that it neglects the role of the hypothesis under consideration in determining… CONTINUE READING
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