Bayesian epistemic values: focus on surprise, measure probability!

  title={Bayesian epistemic values: focus on surprise, measure probability!},
  author={Julio Michael Stern and Carlos Alberto De Bragança Pereira},
  journal={Log. J. IGPL},
The e-value or epistemic value, ev(H ), measures the statistical significance of H , a hypothesis about the parameter θ of a Bayesian model. The e-value is obtained by a probability-possibility transformation of the model’s posterior measure, p(θ ), and can, in turn, be used to define the FBST or Full Bayesian Significance Test. This article investigates the relation of this novel approach to more standard probability-possibility transformations. In particular, we show how and why the e-value… 
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