Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private Values Model

@inproceedings{Manelli2009BayesianAD,
  title={Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private Values Model},
  author={Alejandro M. Manelli and Daniel R. Vincent},
  year={2009}
}
We prove—in the standard independent private-values model—that the outcome, in terms of expected probabilities of trade and expected transfers, of any Bayesian mechanism, can also be obtained with a dominant-strategy mechanism. 
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