Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials

  title={Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials},
  author={Shih-Tang Su and Vijay G. Subramanian and Grant Robert Schoenebeck},
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the sender tries to persuade the receiver to take a particular action via a sequence of signals. This we model by considering multi-phase trials with different experiments conducted based on the outcomes of prior experiments. In contrast to most of the literature, we consider the problem with constraints on signals imposed on the sender. This we achieve by fixing some of the experiments in an exogenous manner; these are called determined… 


Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
  • arXiv preprint arXiv:2110.09594
  • 2021
Bayesian Persuasion
The notion of a persuasion mechanism is introduced: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology that strictly benefits Sender.
Sequential Information Design
This work characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure and shows how to specialize the main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensive-form refinements.
Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
It is shown that in several natural and prominent cases the optimization problem is tractable even when the message space is limited, and a constant-factor approximation algorithm is designed, which stands in marked contrast to the hardness of approximation in the general case.
Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver
It is shown that to optimally screen the receiver, the designer can use a menu of "laminar partitional" signals that partition the states such that the same message is sent in each partition element and the convex hulls of any two partition elements are either nested or have an empty intersection.
Can a Better Informed Listener be Easier to Persuade?
The impact of exogenous news on the classic Bayesian persuasion problem is studied to show that by resolving this tension, more informative news can make the sender better off.
Does Costly Persuasion Signal Quality?
The non-monotone relationship between the designing cost and separating outcomes shows that a seller's ability to provide match information is not necessarily associated with more precise quality information.
Does costly persuasion signal quality? Available at SSRN
  • 2020
Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure
It is proved that it is optimal for the principal to give no information to the detector before a time threshold, run a mixed strategy to confuse the detector at the threshold time, and reveal the true state afterwards.
Dynamic Persuasion With Outside Information
A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside