Bats, balls, and substitution sensitivity: cognitive misers are no happy fools

  title={Bats, balls, and substitution sensitivity: cognitive misers are no happy fools},
  author={Wim De Neys and Sandrine Rossi and Olivier Houd{\'e}},
  journal={Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review},
Influential work on human thinking suggests that our judgment is often biased because we minimize cognitive effort and intuitively substitute hard questions by easier ones. A key question is whether or not people realize that they are doing this and notice their mistake. Here, we test this claim with one of the most publicized examples of the substitution bias, the bat-and-ball problem. We designed an isomorphic control version in which reasoners experience no intuitive pull to substitute… 

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