Bargaining with commitments

  title={Bargaining with commitments},
  author={Juan J. Vidal-Puga},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  • Juan J. Vidal-Puga
  • Published 2004
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • International Journal of Game Theory
  • Abstract.We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which, given an order of players, the first n−1 players sequentially announce their reservation price. Once these prices are given, the last player may choose a coalition to cooperate with, and pay each member of this coalition his reservation price. The only expected final equilibrium payoff is a new solution concept, the “selective value”, which can be defined by means of marginal contributions vectors of a reduced game. The selective value… CONTINUE READING
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