Highly Influenced

@article{Kibris2007BargainingOA, title={Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives}, author={{\"O}zg{\"u}r Kibris and Murat R. Sertel}, journal={Social Choice and Welfare}, year={2007}, volume={28}, pages={421-437} }

- Published 2007 in Social Choice and Welfare
DOI:10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z

We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this… CONTINUE READING