Bargaining in the Shadow of the Website: Disclosure's Impact on Litigation Behavior

  title={Bargaining in the Shadow of the Website: Disclosure's Impact on Litigation Behavior},
  author={Eric A. Helland and Gia B. Lee},
Investigates the significance of secrecy and disclosure for medical malpractice litigation. 

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