Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function

  title={Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function},
  author={John C. Harsanyi},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={29 - 38}
  • J. Harsanyi
  • Published 1 March 1962
  • Economics
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
1 The original version of this paper was written at the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University, under Contract Nonr-358 (01), NR 047-006 of the Cowles Foundation with the Office of Naval Research. It was distributed as Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 46. A revised version of this paper was presented at the Princeton Conference on Game Theory and Negotiations in October, 1961. The paper has benefited from comments by the other participants of the Conference. 2 But… 
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