Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem

@article{Cho2009BargainingFO,
  title={Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem},
  author={Seok-ju Cho and John Duggan},
  journal={J. Econ. Theory},
  year={2009},
  volume={144},
  pages={851-868}
}

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