Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

@inproceedings{SchneiderBargainingPI,
  title={Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models},
  author={Gerald Schneider and Daniel A. Finke and Stefanie Bailer}
}
This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry’s distinction between ‘power’ and ‘luck’, the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU… CONTINUE READING
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