Bargaining Position, Bargaining Power, and the Property Rights Approach

  title={Bargaining Position, Bargaining Power, and the Property Rights Approach},
  author={Patrick W. Schmitz},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
  • P. Schmitz
  • Published 1 January 2013
  • Economics
  • CEPR Discussion Paper Series
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