Bargaining Position, Bargaining Power, and the Property Rights Approach

@article{Schmitz2013BargainingPB,
  title={Bargaining Position, Bargaining Power, and the Property Rights Approach},
  author={P. Schmitz},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
  year={2013}
}
  • P. Schmitz
  • Published 2013
  • Economics
  • CEPR Discussion Paper Series
In the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Hart, 1995), parties bargain about whether or not to collaborate after non-contractible investments have been made. Most contributions apply the regular Nash bargaining solution. We explore the implications of using the generalized Nash bargaining solution. A prominent finding regarding the suboptimality of joint ownership turns out to be robust. However, in contrast to the standard property rights model, it may well be optimal to give… Expand
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