Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?

  title={Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?},
  author={Daniel W. Drezner},
  journal={International Organization},
  pages={73 - 102}
Scholars and policymakers generally assume that multilateral cooperation is a necessary condition for economic sanctions to be of any use. However, previous statistical tests of this assumption have shown that sanctions are more successful with lower levels of cooperation. This puzzle calls into question established theories of economic statecraft as well as theories of international cooperation. In this article I test possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of multilateral cooperation on… Expand
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