Bankruptcy “Reform” in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process

Abstract

Both ideology and interest group interventions are important in voting on bankruptcy legislation. Roughly 15 votes in the House appear to have been changed directly through interest group pressures proxied by campaign contributions. Many more could have been changed if resources could be fully devoted to spot purchases, but most contributions appear to have been aimed at maintaining legislation on the agenda. In the Senate, state interests on homestead exemptions influenced voting. Although committee markups demonstrate an ideological lineup that is not distinct from floor voting, committees promote bargaining on destabilizing issues. ______________________________________________________________________________________ * Nunez is at Stanford University and Rosenthal at Princeton University and Russell Sage Foundation. E-mail: snunez@Stanford.edu, rosentha@Princeton.edu. Correspondence: Howard Rosenthal, Russell Sage Foundation, 112 E. 64 St., New York, NY, 10021, USA. Alan Wan wrote the MATLAB program for optimizing contributions. The data for this study is posted as Excel files at www.princeton.edu/~rosentha.

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Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Nunez2002BankruptcyI, title={Bankruptcy “Reform” in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process}, author={Stephen Nunez and Howard Rosenthal}, year={2002} }