Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default
@article{Gilson1990BankruptcyBB,
title={Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default},
author={S. Gilson},
journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
year={1990},
volume={27},
pages={355-387}
}Abstract In 111 publicly traded firms that either file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt between 1979 and 1985, bank lenders frequently become major stockholders or appoint new directors. On average, only 46% of incumbent directors remain when bankruptcy or debt restructuring ends. Directors who resign hold significantly fewer seats on other boards following their departure. Common-stock ownership becomes more concentrated with large blockholders and less with corporate… Expand
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