Banking regulation and competition with product differentiation

@inproceedings{Schargrodsky2000BankingRA,
  title={Banking regulation and competition with product differentiation},
  author={Ernesto Schargrodsky and Federico Sturzenegger},
  year={2000}
}
The main motivation for prudential regulation is to increase the solvency of the banking sector. However, it is usually understood that tighter regulation also leads to more concentration and higher spreads. Thus, these prudential measures are seen as implying a trade-off between solvency and competition. In this paper we argue that this trade-off does not necessarily exist. We present a model in which tighter capital requirements lead banks to choose a lower degree of product differentiation… CONTINUE READING

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