Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending

  title={Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending},
  author={Thorsten Beck and Aslı Demirg{\"u}ç-Kunt and Ross Levine},
Which commercial bank supervisory policies ease – or intensify – the degree to which bank corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance? Based on new data from more than 2,500 firms across 37 countries, this paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of different bank supervisory policies on firms’ financing obstacles. We find that the traditional approach to bank supervision, which involves empowering official supervisory agencies to directly monitor, discipline… CONTINUE READING
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