Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

  title={Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity},
  author={Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  pages={401 - 419}
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RareBooksClub. Paperback. Book Condition: New. This item is printed on demand. Paperback. 142 pages. Dimensions: 9.7in. x 7.4in. x 0.3in.This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text.
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