• Corpus ID: 229153577

Bandit Learning in Decentralized Matching Markets

  title={Bandit Learning in Decentralized Matching Markets},
  author={Lydia T. Liu and Feng Ruan and Horia Mania and M.I. Jordan},
  journal={J. Mach. Learn. Res.},
We study two-sided matching markets in which one side of the market (the players) does not have a priori knowledge about its preferences for the other side (the arms) and is required to learn its preferences from experience. Also, we assume the players have no direct means of communication. This model extends the standard stochastic multi-armed bandit framework to a decentralized multiple player setting with competition. We introduce a new algorithm for this setting that, over a time horizon $T… 

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