Balance of power and the propensity of conflict

@article{Herbst2017BalanceOP,
  title={Balance of power and the propensity of conflict},
  author={Luisa Herbst and Kai A. Konrad and Florian Morath},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2017},
  volume={103},
  pages={168-184}
}
We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players’unequal fighting strengths, strategic… CONTINUE READING