Backdoor peacekeeping
@article{Lundgren2018BackdoorP,
title={Backdoor peacekeeping},
author={Magnus Lundgren},
journal={Journal of Peace Research},
year={2018},
volume={55},
pages={508 - 523}
}I advance and test a theoretical argument of how participation in UN peacekeeping affects the likelihood of coup attempts in troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The argument highlights the interplay between the economic incentives of militaries in poor TCCs and the UN’s preference for contributors with stable civil–military relations. Fearing the loss of UN reimbursement funds, militaries for which such funds are important will avoid visible acts of military insubordination, such as coup… CONTINUE READING
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