author={Stergios Skaperdas},
  journal={Defence and Peace Economics},
  pages={657 - 676}
  • S. Skaperdas
  • Published 1 September 2006
  • Economics
  • Defence and Peace Economics
I examine the determinants of conflict and settlement by embedding probabilistic contests in a bargaining framework. Different costly enforcement efforts (e.g. arming, litigation expenditures) induce different disagreement points and Pareto frontiers. After examining the incentives for settlement, I demonstrate how different division rules and bargaining norms have real, economic effects. I then analyze some sources of conflict. I emphasize long‐term, strategic considerations by examining an… 

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