Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property

@article{Kamijo2010AxiomatizationOT,
  title={Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property},
  author={Yoshio Kamijo and Takumi Kongo},
  journal={Int. J. Game Theory},
  year={2010},
  volume={39},
  pages={563-571}
}
This paper presents an axiomatization of the Shapley value. The balanced cycle contributions property is the key axiom in this paper. It requires that, for any order of all the players, the sum of the claims from each player against his predecessor is balanced with the sum of the claims from each player against his successor. This property is satisfied not only by the Shapley value but also by some other values for TU games. Hence, it is a less restrictive requirement than the balanced… CONTINUE READING
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