Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption

@article{Myerson1995AxiomaticDO,
  title={Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption},
  author={Roger B. Myerson},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={1995},
  volume={12},
  pages={59-74}
}
Earlier derivations of scoring rules, by Smith (1973) and Young (1975), assumed that a voter can express only a rank ordering of the alternatives on his or her ballot. This paper shows that scoring rules can be derived without this ordering assumption. It is shown that a voting rule must be a scoring rule if it satisfies three basic axioms: reinforcement, overwhelming majorities, and neutrality. Other range and nonreversal axioms are also discussed. 

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