Axiomatic Justification of Stable Equilibria

@inproceedings{Govindan2004AxiomaticJO,
  title={Axiomatic Justification of Stable Equilibria},
  author={Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson},
  year={2004}
}
A solution concept that satisfies the axioms of invariance and strong backward induction selects a stable set of a game’s equilibria. 

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 19 references

A Relation between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper

  • E. van Damme
  • 1984
Highly Influential
10 Excerpts

Invariance of Stable Equilibria of Signaling Games,

  • S. Govindan, R. Wilson
  • Festshrift in Honor of Steinar Ekern
  • 2002
Highly Influential
2 Excerpts

tainty” and “Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements,

  • J. Bochnak, M. Coste, M-F
  • Real Algebraic Geometry. Berlin:
  • 1998
Highly Influential
1 Excerpt

The Principle of Forward Induction , ” to appear

  • S. Govindan
  • 2004

The Principle of Forward Induction,

  • S. Western Ontario. Govindan, R. Wilson
  • Hillas, J
  • 2004
2 Excerpts

How Much of Forward Induction is Implied by Backward Induction and Ordinality

  • J. Hillas
  • 1996
1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…