Awareness as inference in a higher-order state space

  title={Awareness as inference in a higher-order state space},
  author={Stephen M. Fleming},
  journal={Neuroscience of Consciousness},
  • S. Fleming
  • Published 31 May 2019
  • Philosophy
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness
Abstract Humans have the ability to report the contents of their subjective experience—we can say to each other, ‘I am aware of X’. The decision processes that support these reports about mental contents remain poorly understood. In this article, I propose a computational framework that characterizes awareness reports as metacognitive decisions (inference) about a generative model of perceptual content. This account is motivated from the perspective of how flexible hierarchical state spaces are… 

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