Autonomy in Neuroethics: Political and Not Metaphysical

@article{Dubljevi2013AutonomyIN,
  title={Autonomy in Neuroethics: Political and Not Metaphysical},
  author={Veljko Dubljevi{\'c}},
  journal={AJOB Neuroscience},
  year={2013},
  volume={4},
  pages={44 - 51}
}
This article examines and refutes the claims that neuroscientific evidence renders autonomy “quixotic” and thus supports a shift toward paternalism in medical and political decision-making. The author argues that the notion of autonomy has been mistakenly associated with the metaphysical concept of free will, and offers a political definition of autonomy to clarify how responsibility is implicitly grounded in the legal and political system: An agent acts autonomously when she/he (a) endorses… 

Autonomy is Political, Pragmatic, and Postmetaphysical: A Reply to Open Peer Commentaries on “Autonomy in Neuroethics”

In a target article (Dubljevi c 2013), I concluded that the moral–political notion of autonomy was mistakenly associated with the metaphysical concept of “free will.” Although there are important

The Illusion of Post Hoc Autonomy

Veljko Dubljević (2013) resolves the “quixotic” nature of autonomy by drawing a distinction between autonomy as a political construct and free will as a metaphysical abstraction. According to

Autonomy as a Negotiated Concept: The Case of Informed Consent

On the broad question of autonomy as more political than metaphysical, Dubljević’s arguments (2013) are useful and worth serious consideration. What I argue here is that indeed autonomy in

The Importance of the Self for Autonomous Behavior

Neuroscientific findings have often been argued to undermine notions of free will and to require far-reaching changes of our political and legal systems. Making a difference between the metaphysical

Is the Proposal of the Political Notion of Autonomy Problematic?

  • Veljko Dubljević
  • Philosophy
    The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology
  • 2019
My prior work on autonomy (see Dubljevic in Am J Bioeth Neurosci 4(4):44–51, 2013 and Chap. 3) took up the challenge posed by Felsen and Reiner (Am J Bioeth Neurosci 2(3):3–14, 2011) to substantially

The Metaphysical Assumptions Required for Political Autonomy

person’s circumstances decisively warrant it? Though the truth of determinism wouldn’t erase the significance of choice when deciding who to compensate, it does presumably reduce the weight it should

The Socio-Political Roles of Neuroethics and the Case of Klotho

Klotho, the supposed “longevity protein,” is taken as a modern neuroethics case to exemplify the obstacles faced in securing neuroethic legitimacy and how the Rawlsian framework may be applied to handle cases such as this.

Autonomy, Free Will, and a Rational Life-Plan: A Practical Perspective

According to Dubljević (2013), there is a conflation of the metaphysical concept of free will with the moral-political concept of autonomy. Because of this conflation, concerns about free will

A Blurry Line Between Metaphysical Free Will and Autonomy in Addiction

The error in Dubljević’s framework of autonomy is that any choice that can be backed by good reasons could ipso facto be deemed “autonomous” with little regard for the original intent.

Judging Deeds, Not Psychopaths

The target article, “What We Owe the Psychopath: A Neuroethical Analysis” (Gillett and Huang 2013), argues that we need to rethink our attitudes toward psychopaths because they are both victims and

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