• Corpus ID: 12759633

Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR

  title={Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR},
  author={Russell S. Sobel and Todd M. Nesbit},
  journal={Southern Economic Journal},
When safety regulation makes automobiles safer, drivers may drive more recklessly, partially or completely offsetting effects on the overall level of safety. Evidence of these offsetting effects has been hard to find, however, primarily because of the aggregate nature of accident data. In this paper we explore how changes in the safety of automobiles used in the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) has altered the incentive of drivers to drive recklessly. This unique data set… 

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