Automating Computational Proofs for Public-Key-Based Key Exchange

Abstract

We present an approach to automating computationally sound proofs of key exchange protocols based on public-key encryption. We show that satisfying the property called occultness in the Dolev–Yao model guarantees the security of a related key exchange protocol in a simple computational model. Security in this simpler model has been shown to imply security in a Bellare–Rogaway-like model. Furthermore, the occultness in the Dolev–Yao model can be searched automatically by a mechanisable procedure. Thus automated proofs for key exchange protocols in the computational model can be achieved. We illustrate the method using the well-known Lowe–Needham–Schroeder protocol.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-16280-0_4

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Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Ngo2010AutomatingCP, title={Automating Computational Proofs for Public-Key-Based Key Exchange}, author={Long Ngo and Colin Boyd and Juan Manuel Gonz{\'a}lez Nieto}, booktitle={ProvSec}, year={2010} }