Automated Market Making: Theory and Practice

  title={Automated Market Making: Theory and Practice},
  author={Abraham Othman},
Market makers are unique entities in a market ecosystem. Unlike other participants that have exposure (either speculative or endogenous) to potential future states of the world, market making agents either endeavor to secure a risk-free profit or to facilitate trade that would otherwise not occur. In this thesis we present a principled theoretical framework for market making along with applications of that framework to different contexts. We begin by presenting a synthesis of two concepts… 

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