Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve

@article{Weeks2008AutocraticAC,
  title={Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve},
  author={Jessica L. P. Weeks},
  journal={International Organization},
  year={2008},
  volume={62},
  pages={35 - 64}
}
Scholars of international relations usually argue that democracies are better able to signal their foreign policy intentions than nondemocracies, in part because democracies have an advantage in generating audience costs that make backing down in international crises costly to the leader. This article argues that the conventional hypothesis underestimates the extent to which nondemocratic leaders can be held accountable domestically, allowing them to generate audience costs. First, I identify… 
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International crises are modeled as a political “war of attrition†in which state leaders choose at each moment whether to attack, back down, or escalate. A leader who backs down suffers audience
Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach
  • Michael Tomz
  • Political Science
    International Organization
  • 2007
What makes international threats credible? Recent theories point to domestic audience costs—the domestic price a leader would pay for making foreign threats and then backing down. This article
Looking for Audience Costs
The methodological issues that arise in testing Fearon's argument about domestic political audience costs and signaling in international crises are examined, in particular the difficulty of finding
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Audience costs enable leaders to make credible commitments and to communicate their intentions to their adversaries during a crisis. I explain audience costs by simultaneously modeling crisis
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Fearon (1994a) concludes that democracies should be less likely to back down in crises and thus be able signal resolve more effectively than autocratic states. The authors evaluate this argument
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