Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies

  title={Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies},
  author={Abel Escrib{\`a}-Folch and Tobias B{\"o}hmelt and Ulrich Pilster},
  journal={Conflict Management and Peace Science},
  pages={559 - 579}
How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes… 

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