Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme

H. Hong; T. Wong

DOI:10.1177/0951629820910563

Corpus ID: 13901166

Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme

@article{Hong2020AuthoritarianEA,
  title={Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme},
  author={H. Hong and T. Wong},
  journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  year={2020},
  volume={32},
  pages={460 - 493}
}

H. Hong, T. Wong

Published 2020

Political Science

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, elite class members may lack incentive for the contribution of their efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study the decision of authoritarian rulers to introduce elections. Our model suggests that elections can motivate the ruling class to devote more effort to public good provision. As a result, elections alleviate the moral-hazard-in-teams problem within the authoritarian government. Excessive electoral control… CONTINUE READING

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