Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme

  title={Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme},
  author={H. Hong and T. Wong},
  journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  pages={460 - 493}
  • H. Hong, T. Wong
  • Published 2020
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Theoretical Politics
  • Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, elite class members may lack incentive for the contribution of their efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study the decision of authoritarian rulers to introduce elections. Our model suggests that elections can motivate the ruling class to devote more effort to public good provision. As a result, elections alleviate the moral-hazard-in-teams problem within the authoritarian government. Excessive electoral control… CONTINUE READING
    1 Citations
    Editors’ introduction to JTP issue 32(3)


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