Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme

  title={Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme},
  author={Hao Hong and Tsz-Ning Wong},
  journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  pages={460 - 493}
Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, elite class members may lack incentive for the contribution of their efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study the decision of authoritarian rulers to introduce elections. Our model suggests that elections can motivate the ruling class to devote more effort to public good provision. As a result, elections alleviate the moral-hazard-in-teams problem within the authoritarian government. Excessive electoral control… 
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