• Corpus ID: 53334791

Authoritarian Breakdown : Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument

  title={Authoritarian Breakdown : Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument},
  author={Barbara Geddes},
This paper continues a project on the links between different authoritarian institutional structures and the likelihood and mode of transition to democracy. In earlier work, I have argued that different types of authoritarian government have different effects on the incentives confronting regime supporters when faced with challenges to the status quo. To summarize that argument, military regimes tend to split when challenged, personalist regimes to circle the wagons, and single-party regimes to… 

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