Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders

  title={Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders},
  author={Dan Levin and Emre Ozdenoren},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
We investigate bidders’ and seller’s responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders in the first price auction (FPA) and the second price auction (SPA) with independent private valuations. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model. We find that bidders prefer the number of bidders to be revealed in the FPA, are indifferent between revealing and concealing in the SPA, and prefer the SPA to the FPA. If bidders are more pessimistic than the seller then the seller… CONTINUE READING
Highly Cited
This paper has 52 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS



Citations per Year

52 Citations

Semantic Scholar estimates that this publication has 52 citations based on the available data.

See our FAQ for additional information.