• DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3801287
• Corpus ID: 226254288

Auctioning Annuities

@article{Aryal2020AuctioningA,
  title={Auctioning Annuities},
  author={Gaurab Aryal and Eduardo Fajnzylber and Maria Florencia Gabrielli and Manuel Willington},
  journal={ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)},
  year={2020}
}

• Gaurab Aryal, Eduardo Fajnzylber, +1 author M. Willington
• Published 5 November 2020
• Economics
• ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)

We use data on annuities to study and evaluate an imperfectly competitive market where firms have private information about their (annuitization) costs. Our data is from Chile, where the market is structured as first-price-auction-followed-by-bargaining, and where each retiree chooses a firm and an annuity contract to maximize her expected present discounted utility. We find that retirees with low savings have the highest information processing cost, and they also care about firms' risk-ratings the most. Furthermore, while almost 50% of retirees reveal that they do not value leaving bequests, the rest have heterogeneous preference for bequest that, on average, increases with their savings. On the supply side, we find that firms' annuitization costs vary across retirees, and the average costs increase with retirees' savings. If these costs were commonly known then the pensions would increase for everyone, but the increment would be substantial only for the high savers. Likewise, if we simplify the current pricing mechanism by implementing English auctions and "shutting down" the risk-ratings, then the pensions would increase, but again, mostly for the high savers.