Auctioning Annuities

  title={Auctioning Annuities},
  author={Gaurab Aryal and Eduardo Fajnzylber and Maria Florencia Gabrielli and Manuel Willington},
  journal={ERN: Information Asymmetry Models (Topic)},
We use data on annuities to study and evaluate an imperfectly competitive market where firms have private information about their (annuitization) costs. Our data is from Chile, where the market is structured as first-price-auction-followed-by-bargaining, and where each retiree chooses a firm and an annuity contract to maximize her expected present discounted utility. We find that retirees with low savings have the highest information processing cost, and they also care about firms' risk-ratings… 



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