Auction mechanisms and the measurement of WTP and WTA

@inproceedings{ShogrenaAuctionMA,
  title={Auction mechanisms and the measurement of WTP and WTA},
  author={Jason F. Shogrena and Sungwon Chob and Cannon Kooc and John Listd and Changwon Parke and Pablo Polof and Robert Wilhelmib}
}
  • Jason F. Shogrena, Sungwon Chob, +4 authors Robert Wilhelmib
We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms — the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism, the second-price auction, and the random nth-price auction — in the measurement of willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) measures of value. Our results show that initial bidding in trial 1 in each auction does not contradict the endowment effect; but that, if it is the endowment effect that governs people’s initial bidding behavior, it can be eliminated with repetitions of a second… CONTINUE READING

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