Attributions of consciousness.

  title={Attributions of consciousness.},
  author={Justin Sytsma},
  journal={Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science},
  volume={5 6},
  • J. Sytsma
  • Published 1 November 2014
  • Philosophy
  • Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science
UNLABELLED Many philosophers and brain scientists hold that explaining consciousness is one of the major outstanding problems facing modern science today. One type of consciousness in particular-phenomenal consciousness-is thought to be especially problematic. The reasons given for believing that this phenomenon exists in the first place, however, often hinge on the claim that its existence is simply obvious in ordinary perceptual experience. Such claims motivate the study of people's… 


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