Attribution and Accountability: Voting for Roads in Ghana

  title={Attribution and Accountability: Voting for Roads in Ghana},
  author={Robin Harding},
  journal={World Politics},
  pages={656 - 689}
Do voters in Africa use elections to hold governments accountable for their performance in office? In contexts of limited information and weak state capacity, it can be difficult for citizens to attribute the provision of public goods and services to political action. As a result, voters often have little information about government performance on which to condition their electoral support. Such contexts are frequently characterized by clientelism or ethnic politics, and there is a widespread… Expand
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