Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments

@article{Fallis2007AttitudesTE,
  title={Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments},
  author={Don Fallis},
  journal={Studia Logica},
  year={2007},
  volume={86},
  pages={215-246}
}
Several different Bayesian models of epistemic utilities (see, e.g., [37], [24], [40], [46]) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model–suggested independently by Patrick Maher [40] and Graham Oddie [46]–that assigns epistemic utility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the most comprehensive explanation. This is because this proper scoring rule (PSR) model captures a wider range of scientifically acceptable… CONTINUE READING

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