Attacks and Countermeasures for White-box Designs

  title={Attacks and Countermeasures for White-box Designs},
  author={Alex Biryukov and Aleksei Udovenko},
  journal={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
In traditional symmetric cryptography, the adversary has access only to the inputs and outputs of a cryptographic primitive. In the white-box model the adversary is given full access to the implementation. He can use both static and dynamic analysis as well as fault analysis in order to break the cryptosystem, e.g. to extract the embedded secret key. Implementations secure in such model have many applications in industry. However, creating such implementations turns out to be a very challenging… 

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