At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies

@article{Haddock2005AtOW,
  title={At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies},
  author={Adrian Haddock},
  journal={Philosophical Explorations},
  year={2005},
  volume={8},
  pages={157 - 172}
}
Jennifer Hornsby's account of human action frees us from the temptation to think of the person who acts as ‘doing’ the events that are her actions, and thereby removes much of the allure of ‘agent causation’. But her account is spoiled by the claim that physical actions are ‘tryings’ that cause bodily movements. It would be better to think of physical actions and bodily movements as identical; but Hornsby refuses to do this, seemingly because she thinks that to do so would be to endorse the so… Expand
Bodily Movement and Its Significance
I trace the development of one aspect of Fred Stoutland’s thought about action by considering the central role given by contemporary philosophy of action to bodily movement. Those who tell theExpand
From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action
Volitionalism is a theory of action motivated by certain shortcomings in the standard causal theory of action. However, volitionalism is vulnerable to the objection that it distorts the phenomenologyExpand
The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Settling: Some Anscombean Reservations
Abstract Helen Steward accepts what I call the Separation Thesis, the main tenet of which is that the movements one’s body makes when one acts are the causal results of one’s actions. I claim thatExpand
Aristotle on Action
When I raise my arm, what makes it the case that my arm's going up is an instance of my raising my arm? In this paper, I discuss Aristotle's answer to this question. His view, I argue, is that myExpand
Moral Luck and the Possibility of Agential Disjunctivism
Most presentations of the problem of moral luck invoke the notion of control, but little has been said about what control amounts to. We propose a necessary condition on an agent's having been inExpand
Merleau-Ponty and the Transcendental Problem of Bodily Agency
I argue that we find the articulation of a problem concerning bodily agency in the early works of the Merleau-Ponty which he explicates as analogous to what he explicitly calls the problem ofExpand
Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure
New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure,Expand
160520 Agency and Embodiment_sendoff_revised_for_webpage
This paper develops a taxonomy of kinds of actions that can be seen in group agency, human–machine interactions, and virtual realities. These kinds of actions are special in that they are notExpand
Trying to Act
Book synopsis: A Companion to the Philosophy of Action offers a comprehensive overview of the issues and problems central to the philosophy of action. The first volume to survey the entire field ofExpand
Acting with artefacts
Technical artefacts are ubiquitous in modern society, and we act with them all the time. Philosophical action theory, however, has rarely examined the role technical artefacts play in the actionExpand
...
1
2
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 40 REFERENCES
Sartre and action theory
The name 'action theory' is new. But what goes by that name subsumes work of very nearly all of the great philosophers of the past and present. The new name corresponds to a new sort of interest inExpand
Dualism in action
We know what one dualist account of human action looks like, because Descartes gave us one. I want to explore the extent ot which presnet-day accounts of physical action are vulnerable to the chargesExpand
Agency and causal explanation
Book synopsis: Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. ExplainingExpand
Causation and perception: the puzzle unravelled
1. Attempts to give a philosophical analysis of perception haven't come very far since Grice's causal theory of perception (Grice 1961). According to the causal theory, S sees that o is F if and onlyExpand
Actions and the Body: Hornsby vs. Sartre
Jennifer Hornsby has advocated a theory of action which, as I will try to show, is incompatible with Sartre's phenomenological observations on the body. Hornsby's basic explicit presupposition isExpand
Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind
Book synopsis: How is our conception of what there is affected by our counting ourselves as inhabitants of the natural world? How do our actions fit into a world that is altered through our agency?Expand
Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind (Intro. by Baruch A. Brody)
This very ingenious author adopts the principle of Mr Locke before mentioned—that all our simple ideas are derived either from sensation or reflection. This he seems to understand, even in a stricterExpand
Experiences: An Inquiry into Some Ambiguities
Someone who has more sympathy with traditional empiricism than with much of present-day philosophy may ask himself: 'How do my experiences give rise to my beliefs about an external world, and to whatExpand
Mind and World
Modern philosophy finds it difficult to give a satisfactory picture of the place of minds in the world. In "Mind and World", based on the 1991 John Locke Lectures, John McDowell offers his diagnosisExpand
The Limits of Self-Awareness
The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceivingExpand
...
1
2
3
4
...