At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies

  title={At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies},
  author={Adrian Haddock},
  journal={Philosophical Explorations},
  pages={157 - 172}
  • Adrian Haddock
  • Published 1 June 2005
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Explorations
Jennifer Hornsby's account of human action frees us from the temptation to think of the person who acts as ‘doing’ the events that are her actions, and thereby removes much of the allure of ‘agent causation’. But her account is spoiled by the claim that physical actions are ‘tryings’ that cause bodily movements. It would be better to think of physical actions and bodily movements as identical; but Hornsby refuses to do this, seemingly because she thinks that to do so would be to endorse the so… 

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