Asynchronous provably-secure hidden services

  title={Asynchronous provably-secure hidden services},
  author={Philippe Camacho and Fernando Krell},
  journal={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
The client-server architecture is one of the most widely used in the Internet for its simplicity and flexibility. In practice the server is assigned a public address so that its services can be consumed. This makes the server vulnerable to a number of attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), censorship from authoritarian governments or exploitation of software vulnerabilities. 

Techniques for Privacy Over the Interledger

ILP-CEPA is presented, an application layer on top of ILP that uses Tor-style onion routing to obscure all transaction information to on and off path observers, and provides a number of security guarantees.



Locating hidden servers

This work presents fast and cheap attacks that reveal the location of a hidden server, the first actual intersection attacks on any deployed public network: thus confirming general expectations from prior theory and simulation.

Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability in Spite of Active Attacks

A protocol is described which allows to send and receive messages anonymously using an arbitrary communication network, and it is proved to be unconditionally secure.

Secure Multi-Party Computation with Identifiable Abort

This work begins a systematic study of the more robust notion of security with identifiable abort, which leverages the effect of an abort by forcing, upon abort, at least one malicious party to reveal its identity.

Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix Systems (Extended Abstract)

This paper investigates timing analysis attacks on low-latency mix systems and proposes a novel technique, defensive dropping, to thwart timing attacks and shows that defensive dropping can be effective against attackers who employ timing analysis.

Topology-Hiding Computation

The study of MPC has expanded to consider a wide variety of questions, including variants in the attack model, underlying assumptions, complexity and composability of the resulting protocols.

Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router

This second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the original design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points.

Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor

New traffic-analysis techniques are presented that allow adversaries with only a partial view of the network to infer which nodes are being used to relay the anonymous streams and therefore greatly reduce the anonymity provided by Tor, and it is shown that otherwise unrelated streams can be linked back to the same initiator.

The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability

  • D. Chaum
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
    Journal of Cryptology
  • 2004
The solution presented here is unconditionally or cryptographically secure, depending on whether it is based on one-time-use keys or on public keys, respectively, and can be adapted to address efficiently a wide variety of practical considerations.

ISDN-MIXes: Untraceable Communication with Small Bandwidth Overhead

A technique, called ISDN-Mixes, which shows thatUntraceable communication for services like telephony is often considered infeasible in the near future because of bandwidth limitations, but this is not the case.

Onion routing

Onion Routing operates by dynamically building anonymous connections within a network of real-time Chaum Onion Routing, which provides anonymous connections that are strongly resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis.