• Corpus ID: 245827823

Asymptotic Security using Bayesian Defense Mechanisms with Application to Cyber Deception

  title={Asymptotic Security using Bayesian Defense Mechanisms with Application to Cyber Deception},
  author={Hampei Sasahara and Henrik Sandberg},
This paper addresses the question whether model knowledge can guide a defender to appropriate decisions, or not, when an attacker intrudes into control systems. The model-based defense scheme considered in this study, namely Bayesian defense mechanism, chooses reasonable reactions through observation of the system’s behavior using models of the system’s stochastic dynamics, the vulnerability to be exploited, and the attacker’s objective. On the other hand, rational attackers take deceptive… 



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