• Corpus ID: 18421552

Asymptotic Collusion-proofness of Voting Rules when the Number of Candidates is Large

  title={Asymptotic Collusion-proofness of Voting Rules when the Number of Candidates is Large},
  author={Palash Dey and Y. Narahari},
Classical results in voting theory show that strategic manipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant question of how often a voting rule is manipulable. It is well known that elections with a large number of voters are rarely manipulable under impartial culture (IC) assumption. However, the manipulability of voting rules when the number of candidates is large has hardly been addressed in the… 

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