Asymmetric Learning in Repeated Contracting : an Empirical Study

  title={Asymmetric Learning in Repeated Contracting : an Empirical Study},
  author={Alma Cohen},
This paper studies a unique panel dataset of transactions with repeat customers of an insurer operating in a market in which insurers are not required by law or contract to share information about their customers’ records. I use this dataset to test the asymmetric learning hypothesis that sellers obtain over time private information that some of their repeat customers have low risk, and that this learning enables sellers to make higher profits in transactions with these repeat customers… CONTINUE READING
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