Asymmetric Auctions with Resale

@inproceedings{Hafalir2006AsymmetricAW,
  title={Asymmetric Auctions with Resale},
  author={Isa Emin Hafalir and Vijay Krishna},
  year={2006}
}
We study equilibria of …rstand second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting ine¢ ciencies create a motive for post-auction trade. In our basic model, resale takes place via monopoly pricing— the winner of the auction makes a take-it-or-leaveit o¤er to the loser after updating his prior beliefs based on his winning. We show that a …rst-price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium. Our main result is that with… CONTINUE READING
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