Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy

@article{Lyon2004AstroturfIG,
  title={Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy},
  author={Thomas P. Lyon and John W. Maxwell},
  journal={Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Economics \& Management Strategy},
  year={2004}
}
We study three corporate nonmarket strategies designed to influence the lobbying behavior of other special interest groups: (1) astroturf, in which the firm covertly subsidizes a group with similiar views to lobby when it normally would not; (2) the bear hug, in which the firm overtly pays a group to alter its lobbying activitives; and (3) self-regulation, in which the firm voluntarily limits the potential social harm from its activities. All three strategies reduce the informativeness of… 

Lobbying and Nonprofits: Money and Membership Matter—But Not for All†

Objective Lobbying by nonprofits is a relatively new topic that has drawn attention from political science scholars and nonprofit managers. Several studies have demonstrated there to be lobbying

Merchants of doubt: Corporate political action when NGO credibility is uncertain

The literature on special interest groups emphasizes two main influence channels: campaign contributions and informational lobbying. We introduce a third channel: providing information about the

The Multiplex Network of EU Lobby Organizations

A first systematic multi-layer network analysis of a large lobby registry focuses on the domains of finance and climate and finds that the network centrality of lobby organizations has no simple relation with their lobbying budget.

Privatizing Participation: Civic Change and the Organizational Dynamics of Grassroots Lobbying Firms

This article highlights the shifting boundaries between the public and private spheres in advanced capitalist societies through an examination of grassroots lobbying firms. These organizations, which

Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence

Special interests attempt to influence lawmakers through campaign contributions and through informational lobbying. Both avenues have been explored extensively in theoretical models. Only the former,

Lobbying: strategies to make a firm's competences generate value

Extant work on lobbying primarily focuses on who is lobbying and is lobbied as well as strategies of how to exert influence. More fundamentally, we address (1) what drives firms to engage in lobbying

The Internal Limits to Firms' Nonmarket Activities

It is well documented that firms develop nonmarket strategies to try to shape public policy changes to their advantage. But are there no limits to this? This paper argues that there is in fact an

How the Flattened Costs of Grassroots Lobbying Affect Legislator Responsiveness

Leading theories of grassroots lobbying assert that legislators should respond positively to the volume of grassroots lobbying messages because volume indicates the salience of an issue among

Detecting astroturf lobbying movements

  • Brieuc Lits
  • Political Science
    Communication and the Public
  • 2020
Astroturf lobbying refers to the simulation of grassroots support for or against a public policy. The objective of this tactic is for private interests to pretend they have public support for their

Merchants of Doubt: Corporate Political Influence When Expert Credibility is Uncertain

A key role of science-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is to communicate scientific knowledge to policymakers. However, recent evidence has emerged showing that industry-backed groups
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 31 REFERENCES

Lobbying and asymmetric information

Informational lobbying — the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement

Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy

This paper provides a theory of private politics in which an activist seeks to change the production practices of a firm for the purpose of redistribution to those whose interests it supports. The

Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies

List of FiguresList of TablesPreface1Introduction32Tactics and Strategies283Outside Lobbying as Costly Signaling584Public Opinion and Mobilization785Outside Lobbying as Conflict Expansion1016Lobbying

An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures

A number of scholars have identified the important role administrative procedures have in 'structuring' the interest group environment of government agencies: determining who can participate and in

Special Interest Politics

This landmark theoretical book is about the mechanisms by which special interest groups affect policy in modern democracies. Defining a special interest group as any organization that takes action on

Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism

We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political "entry" is costly for consumers, firms can deter it through voluntary

Toward a More General Theory of Regulation

  • S. Peltzman
  • Economics
    The Journal of Law and Economics
  • 1976
In previous literature, George Stigler asserts a law of diminishing returns to group size in politics: Beyond some point it becomes counterproductive to dilute the per capita transfer. Since the

Corporate Environmentalism and Public Policy

This is the first book to provide a hard-headed economic view of the voluntary approaches to environmental issues, especially toxic chemicals, waste disposal and global warming, that have become

Self-Regulation, Taxation, and Public Voluntary Environmental Agreements

An increasingly popular instrument for solving environmental problems is the "public voluntary agreement (VA)", in which government offers technical assistance and positive publicity to firms that

A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action

  • S. Lohmann
  • Political Science
    American Political Science Review
  • 1993
I develop a signaling model of mass political action. I establish that rational, self-interested individuals may have incentives to engage in costly political action despite a free-rider problem.